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Article 197 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
stipulates that effective implementation of Union law by the Member 
States shall be regarded as a matter of common interest.  This article 
considers  how  Member  States  may  improve  their  administrative 
capacity  to  apply  EU  law  effectively.  A  law  or  policy  is  effectively 
implemented when it can be confirmed that its objectives, targets 
or  results  are  actually  achieved.  It  is  proposed  that  effective 
implementation in the EU is a ‘collaborative project’. This is not only 
because  Member  States  benefit  when  others  correctly  implement 
common rules, but also because they learn from the experiences of 
other Member States. It follows that the public authorities responsible 
for implementation of EU law need to benchmark their performance 
against that of their peers in other Member States and therefore need 
to develop the institutional capacity for assessing and adjusting their 
own performance.
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Introduction
A law is a set of rules that prescribe or proscribe in order to 
regulate  the  behaviour  of  persons  or  organisations1.  This 
regulatory responsibility is normally the prerogative of the state. 
In practice, however, it is the agents of the state that ensure 
that laws are applied correctly. These agents are the various 
components of the civil service or public administration. 
Article 197 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union provides that
‘1.  Effective  implementation  of  Union  law  by  the  Member   
  States, which is essential for the proper functioning of the   
  Union, shall be regarded as a matter of common interest.
2.   The Union may support the efforts of Member States to   
  improve their administrative capacity to implement Union   
  law. …’
Article  197 TFEU  makes  two  connections:  one  explicit,  the 
other implicit. It explicitly concatenates the proper functioning 
of  the  EU  and  effective  implementation  of  its  law;  and  it 
implicitly links the achievement of effective implementation 
to the administrative capacity of Member States.
The purpose of this article is to explore the second connection 
and consider what kind of ‘administrative capacity’ may be 
necessary for effective implementation of EU law. This is not 
an easy task, given that there appears to be no definition of 
effective implementation in primary or secondary legislation 
or in the case law of EU courts2. Therefore, this article proposes, 
first, a definition of effective implementation of law or policy 
and, then, relates the achievement of effective implementation 
to administrative capacity.
The  main  propositions  developed  in  the  article  are  the 
following. A law or policy is effectively implemented when 
it can be confirmed that its objectives, targets or results are 
actually achieved. Since policy objectives can be overly general 
and legal obligations can be vague or ambiguous, effective 
implementation  must  start  with  the  ‘operationalisation’  of 
general or vague objectives. This operationalisation derives 
tangible goals from general or vague objectives. For example, 
the general objective of ‘raising national well-being’ can be 
translated into the tangible goal of ‘access to health services’.
But  this  process  of  operationalisation  encounters  another 
problem: it is rarely obvious what kind of tangible goals can 
or should be derived. This requires interpretation either on 
the basis of theory and analysis, or on the basis of experience 
and comparison with similar situations. If the implementing 
authority chooses the latter approach, it may ask what a peer 
authority would do in the same situation. It should not choose 
arbitrarily from the range of possible options; it needs to make 
a reasonable case.
A  comparison  of  decisions  made  by  similar  authorities 
provides guidance not only in cases of vague policy objectives, 
but also in cases where the effects of policy instruments are 
uncertain. The overall objective may, in fact, be very clear and 
measurable but it may not be easy to define ex ante the most 
effective instrument for achieving that objective. For example, 
the objective of reducing road fatalities, which is measurable, 
may  be  achieved  by  different  means  such  as  reduction  of 
speed limits, installation of more speed cameras, increasing 
fines  for  speeding,  improvement  of  roads  or  compulsory   
re-training of drivers. These means may vary significantly in 
terms of their cost, deterrent effect and gestation period.
Because  comparison  of  policy  performance  or  legal 
enforcement  is  an  indispensable  component  of  assessing 
the  effectiveness  of  implementation  of  policy  or  law, 
this  article  argues  that  in  the  context  of  the  EU,  effective 
implementation becomes a ‘collaborative project’. This is not 
only  because  each  partner  country  benefits  when  others 
implement fully or correctly common rules, but also because 
each partner country cannot be absolutely certain that it has 
implemented fully or correctly unless it compares its efforts to 
those of others. Effective implementation of EU law requires 
continuous  benchmarking  of 
the  performance  of  national 
authorities  against  those  of 
their  peers  in  other  Member 
States. All these considerations 
have implications on how public 
administrations function3. 
The nature of the problem
Before defining the meaning of effective implementation, it is 
instructive to provide examples of the problem of ineffective 
implementation so that the reader gains a better understanding 
how  it  affects  the ‘proper  functioning  of  the  Union’,  in  the 
meaning of Article 197 TFEU. This section presents two recent 
cases.  The  first  highlights  the  challenge  of  correct  policy 
application, while the other demonstrates how incorrect legal 
interpretation impacts on institutional structure.
The policy side
Since July 2004, the Council of the EU has been recording that 
Hungary’s budget deficit exceeded the allowable threshold – 
3% of GDP – and has been issuing successive recommendations 
to  Hungary  to  take  appropriate  measures.  On  24  January 
2012  the  Council  again  examined  Hungary’s  response  and 
concluded that it was inadequate. Hungary claimed that it 
had turned the budget deficit into a surplus, but in fact that 
was merely a temporary change. It was the result of a one-off 
increase in revenue. There was no effective correction. More 
specifically, the Council Decision noted that ‘Hungary had not 
taken effective action’. ‘While Hungary formally respected the 
3% of GDP reference value, this was not based on a structural 
and sustainable correction. The budget surplus in 2011 hinged 
upon substantial one-off revenues of over 10% of GDP and 
was accompanied by a cumulative structural deterioration in 
2010 and 2011 of 2.75% of GDP compared to a recommended 
cumulative  fiscal  improvement  of  0.5%  of  GDP4.’    Hungary 
claimed the facts vindicated it, but the Council looked beyond 
the headline numbers.7
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In the end, after eight years of warnings and recommendations, 
the patience of the Council was exhausted. On 13 March, the 
Council decided to withhold, as of 1 January 2012, €495 million 
from the money that had been provisionally earmarked in the 
EU’s Cohesion Fund for Hungary5. 
This  case  illustrates  the  difference  between  formalistic 
implementation and effective implementation. On the surface, 
the  dispute  between  the  Council  and  Hungary  is  about 
numbers. In reality, however, it is about the real impact of 
Hungary’s measures to reduce its deficit. Hungary maintained 
that  it  had  formally  conformed  to  the  deficit  requirement.   
The Council saw no real compliance with the spirit of the rule 
on sustainable public finances. The Council was right, of course.
The legal side
Recently  the  Court  of  Justice  was  asked  to  rule  on  the 
interpretation  of  Article  6(3)  of  Directive  2001/426.  This 
Directive lays down rules on environmental impact assessment 
and  requires,  inter  alia,  that  public  authorities  prepare 
reports on the likely environmental effects of their measures.   
An authority that prepares such a report has to consult widely, 
since, ‘as a rule, the inclusion of a wider set of factors in decision-
making  will  contribute  to  more  sustainable  and  effective 
solutions7.’ Article 6(3) of the Directive provides that ‘Member 
States shall designate the authorities to be consulted…’ In the 
Seaport case8,  the question arose as to what happens when 
the authority that prepares an environmental report is also 
the sole designated authority for consultation9. Must it consult 
itself? In this situation must the Member State concerned – the 
UK in this case – designate another authority? 
The Commission and the UK argued that the Directive was 
silent on this point and that it was therefore up to the Member 
States to decide what do to. The Advocate General disagreed 
in his opinion. He stated that even though it was not explicitly 
required by the Directive, Member States had to designate 
a separate authority to be consulted. The Court of Justice in 
its  judgement  of  20  October  2011  adopted  an 
intermediate, and more reasonable, position.
According  to  the  Court,  the  reason  that  the 
consultation  of  the  relevant  authorities  was 
included in the procedure is to take ‘due account’ 
of  environmental  effects  and  for  alternatives 
to  be ‘objectively  considered’. The  provisions  of 
Directive 2001/42 would be ‘deprived of practical 
effect  if  in  circumstances  where  the  authority 
designated… is itself also required to prepare or 
adopt a plan or programme’10. ‘However, in such a situation, 
Article  6  does  require  that,  within  the  authority  usually 
responsible  for  consultation  on  environmental  matters,  a 
functional separation be organised so that an administrative 
entity internal to it has real autonomy, meaning, in particular, 
that it is provided with administrative and human resources 
of its own and is thus in a position to fulfil the tasks entrusted 
to authorities to be consulted as provided for in that directive, 
and, in particular, to give an objective opinion on the plan 
or  programme  envisaged  by  the  authority  to  which  it  is 
attached11’. 
The outcome of this case was unpredictable. Opinions among 
the  most  senior  legal  professionals  diverged  significantly.   
The Court reached its conclusion by asking what the objective 
of the Directive was and how it could be most effectively 
achieved.  Different  judges  could  have  drawn  different 
conclusions. The point here is not that conclusions could differ, 
but that effective implementation always requires assessment 
of  whether  what  is  achieved  corresponds  indeed  with  the 
objectives defined in law or policy.
Effective implementation: theoretical considerations
The dictionary definition of the verb ‘to implement’ is ‘to put 
into  effect  according  to  or  by  means  of  a  definite  plan  or 
procedure’12. This implies that in order to implement anything 
you need first to set an objective or goal, and then draw up 
directions on how to reach that objective 
or  goal.  The  addition  of  the  adjective 
‘effective’ to the noun ‘implementation’ 
connotes that the act of implementation 
is  not  mechanical,  formalistic  or 
perfunctory.  Rather  it  highlights  the 
intention  to  achieve  fully  the  desired 
objective or goal. The focus of the action 
is not on the process but on the result.
Therefore,  at  the  heart  of  the  concept 
of  effective  implementation  is  an 
implicit but indispensable ability to determine whether the 
desired  objective  has  been  achieved:  to  put  it  differently, 
you need to know whether you have reached your goal. This 
in turn entails that the objective or goal can be measured or 
quantified and that there are ways to verify that the results of 
the implementing action or actions correspond to the desired 
objective.
Effective  implementation  of  a  policy  is  a  never-ending 
process.  It  involves  constant  monitoring  of  the  effects 
of  implementing  actions  and  adjustment,  if  necessary,  of 
implementing instruments.
To  understand  why  policy  implementation  is 
more likely to follow a circular rather than linear 
path, one needs to appreciate the ‘root problem’ 
of policies. The word ‘root’ here has two meanings. 
First, it indicates a problem which is at the core of 
any policy formulation and application. Second, 
it is a pictorial representation of the nature of that 
problem. It very much looks like the root system 
of plants.
The  root  problem  has  two  aspects.  First,  a 
policy objective can normally be achieved through multiple 
instruments.  It  follows  that  the  right  instrument  has  to  be 
selected  according  to  certain  desirable  features  such  as 
efficiency or cost.
Effective implementation of a policy is a 
never-ending process. It involves constant 
monitoring of the effects of implementing 
actions  and  adjustment,  if  necessary,  of 
implementing instruments.8
For  example,  the  economic  integration  of  migrants  can  be 
achieved through training courses to help them develop new 
skills  or  through  a  more  interventionist  measure  involving 
actual placement of migrants in selected jobs. Protection of 
consumers from abusive selling practices by energy providers 
can be achieved directly through price regulation or indirectly 
through market liberalisation and entry of more providers. The 
choice of the right instrument is dependent on factors such 
as availability of information on costs, the need to incentivise 
market operators to invest and offer cost-efficient services and 
the administrative costs of supervision.
The second aspect of the root problem is the mirror image of 
the first. The same instrument may have multiple effects some   
of which may be undesirable. These side-effects can be costly 
and counter-productive.
For  example,  as  is  now  well  understood,  price  regulation 
of energy utilities can keep prices at an affordable level for 
consumers  by  preventing  energy  suppliers  from  charging 
excessively above cost. That, however, comes at the expense 
of not inducing sufficient investment which can lead to lower 
prices  in  the  long  term.  Companies  can  be  incentivised  to 
make  long-term  investments  only  if  there  is  a  prospect  of 
adequate profit, which implies that in the short-term, prices 
may have to remain considerably above costs.
The figure below depicts the two aspects of the root problem.
The root problem entails the results having to be constantly 
monitored  and  assessed.  Failure  to  reach  pre-determined 
targets  should  lead  to  adjustment  of  policy  application  of 
legal enforcement. In a world of informational imperfections, 
policy makers can never be sure that what appears feasible 
can indeed be achieved, and if it is eventually achieved, that it 
is the best that could be achieved. The act of implementation 
itself generates information which is useful and has to be fed 
back into the design of the implementation process and the 
choice of right instruments. Since, however, the information 
that the act of implementation generates is partly shaped by 
the efforts of the implementing or enforcing authority, one can 
never be certain about the extent to which such information 
reflects  the  objective  state  of  the  world  or  the  subjective 
efforts of the authority.
One  way  of  making  sense  of  the  feedback  is  to  compare 
what  that  authority  achieves  or  how  it  performs  with  the 
performance of other similar authorities. Peer comparison is a 
valuable ‘reality check’.
To summarise so far, policy implementation means purposeful 
action. It means that authorities: a. define ex ante one or more 
operational  targets;  b.  carry  out  ex  post  checks  to  confirm 
that the targets are achieved; and c. benchmark their own 
performance against peers to ensure that targets are credible 
and  achievements  are  within  the  boundaries  of  what  is 
reasonable. 
Necessary  administrative  capacity  and  the  usefulness  of 
comparative assessment
Let’s consider how this formulation of effective implementation 
can  be  translated  into  administrative  capacity13.  A  public 
authority  such  as  a  ministry  or  agency  that  is  responsible 
for  enforcing  a  law  or  implementing  a  policy  and,  as  a 
consequence has to act purposefully towards that end, must 
obviously have: a. knowledge about what has to be achieved 
(i.e.  expertise);  b.  ability  or  capacity  to  reach  its  objectives 
(i.e. legal empowerment and human and material resources); 
and c. motivation to reach them (i.e. incentives, which can be 
inducements or penalties). Let’s call these the ‘three pillars of 
institutional capacity’.
A  timely  and  rather  sad  reminder  of  the  indispensability 
of  these  three  pillars  of  institutional  capacity  has  been 
provided by the Second Quarterly Report of 
the Task  Force  for  Greece,  which  was  issued 
in  March  2012.  The  Report  observes  that 
‘preparatory work shows that in certain areas 
the Greek administration lacks the monitoring, 
reporting or control systems needed to ensure 
effective policy implementation.’ [p.4] In other 
words,  Greece  does  not  have  the  requisite 
administrative  capacity  because  public 
authorities do not have sufficient information 
on the impact of the policy instruments they 
deploy and, even worse, they are not able to 
steer those instruments towards the objectives 
they seek to achieve.
Of  course,  Greek  public  authorities  must  be 
aware of these deficiencies. So the inevitable 
question  is  why  do  they  not  take  remedial 
action? The First Quarterly Report14 of the Task Force referred 
to  structural  weaknesses  such  as ‘no  accountability  of  the 
results’ and ‘lack of supervision’ [p.15]. In order to implement 
effectively, public authorities have to be incentivised to do 
so. Accountability mechanisms do provide such an incentive. 
Examples  of  accountability  mechanisms  are  obligations  to 
follow transparent procedures and to explain and motivate 
policy decisions.
In addition, the implementing authority has to be accountable 
to  a  principal  for  its  actions.  Otherwise  there  can  be  no 
assurance  that  it  will  try  as  hard  as  it  can  to  achieve  the 
objectives of the policy for which it is responsible. The principal 
should be able to exercise at least minimal control15. 
But, there is another problem here. The ‘root problem’ suggests 
the  existence  of  inherent  uncertainties  and  informational 
imperfections in policy-making and policy implementation. 
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Figure 1: The root problem of policy formulation and implementation
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How  would  those  who  oversee  performance  of  agents  be 
satisfied that it is good enough, if they are not sure how overall 
policy objectives can be operationalised in specific targets, 
what policy instruments are the rights ones or how the effects 
of those instruments can be measured, for example?
Therefore,  a  different  approach  to  raising  accountability 
and  offering  incentives  for  better  results  is  to  benchmark 
organisational  performance  against  those  of  peers. 
Benchmarking  here  is  another  way  of  asking  what  a 
comparable organisation would do in similar circumstances 
in  order  to  find  out  whether  both  the  operational  policy 
targets set by the organisation in question and the outcomes 
it achieves are reasonable.
The need to assess whether performance is satisfactory stems 
from the fact that any law and any policy has to be interpreted 
in the sense that it has to be decided by those who apply 
a  policy  or  enforce  a  law  as  to  whether  it  fits  the  specific 
circumstances of each particular instance of implementation16. 
Recent empirical research has also shown the importance of 
asking what someone else would do in the same situation. 
Apparently,  when  different  persons  are  asked  to  interpret 
the same piece of legislation, their answers vary depending 
on their personal preferences and ideological inclinations. By 
contrast, when the same persons are asked to bear in mind 
what the average person would do in the same situation, their 
answers converge17.  
Peer or comparative assessment is an indispensable component 
of  administrative  capacity  for  effective  implementation 
and has to be built in the structure of any implementing or 
enforcing organisation through institutionalised regular self-
reviews or external reviews.
Comparative  assessment 
of  performance  is  both, 
more  feasible  and  more 
important  in  the  context 
of  the  EU.  It  is  more 
feasible  because  there 
are at least 27 authorities 
responsible  for  the 
same  task.  It  is  more 
important for the EU than 
for individual countries because of the significant degree of 
discretion that Member States have to determine their own 
methods  of  implementation  of  EU  law  and  policies.  Such 
discretion exists not only in the case of directives, but also 
in the case of regulations. The important point here is that 
effective  implementation  becomes  a  collaborative  project.   
We all benefit by learning from each other.
However, if cross-border comparison is to generate valuable 
information, policy outcomes and institutional performances 
across  the  different  Member  States  need  to  be  assessed 
systematically. This comparative assessment is the natural task 
of the Commission or more specialised European agencies. 
In this connection, there is a gap in the text of Article 197 
TFEU. It does not provide for this type of assessment. It limits 
itself to action that ‘may include facilitating the exchange of 
information and of civil servants as well as supporting training 
schemes18.’  Exchange of information and training is indeed 
very  useful;  but  unfortunately  ‘no  Member  State  shall  be 
obliged to avail itself of such support.’
Effective  implementation  of  EU  rules:  the  ‘reality  check’ 
performed by the European Court of Auditors
The  previous  sections  considered  how  effective 
implementation  could  be  understood 
and what kind of administrative capacity 
was  necessary  to  achieve  that  kind  of 
implementation. This section examines 
how  this  concept  has  been  applied  in 
practice in the assessments carried out 
by the European Court of Auditors.
The main task of the ECA is to audit the 
annual  accounts  of  EU  institutions  and  agencies  and  the 
accounts of national authorities which receive and disburse 
EU  funds.  In  addition,  it  conducts,  on  its  own  initiative, 
assessments  of  EU  policies,  of  the  application  of  EU  law 
and  of  the  corresponding  administrative  procedures  and 
management performance of Member States. The results of 
these assessments are then published in so-called ‘special 
reports’. This section summarises the main critical findings of 
a sample of special reports drawn from the publications of 
the past few years. The sample is not random; rather it was 
chosen in such a way so as to cover diverse policy areas.
The  following  reports  have  been  examined  [references 
indicated in brackets]:
•  The EU Transit System [11/2006]
•  Are Simplified Customs Procedures for Imports Effectively   
  Controlled? [1/2010]
•  The Audit of the SME Guarantee Facility [4/2011]
•  Are the School Milk and the School Fruit Schemes 
  Effective? [10/2011]
•  Do the Design and Management of the Geographical 
  Indications Scheme allow it to be Effective? [11/2011]
•  Does the Control of Customs Procedure 42 Prevent and 
  Detect VAT Evasion? [13/2011]
•  Has EU Assistance Improved Croatia’s Capacity to Manage 
  Post-Accession Funding? [14/2011]
•  Effectiveness of EU Development Aid for Food Security 
  in Sub-Saharan Africa [1/2012]
•  Financial Instruments for SMEs Co-financed by 
  the European Regional Development Fund [2/2012]
What can we learn from the ECA special reports? The ECA 
reports  can  be  read  and  understood  on  two  levels:  that 
of  the  methodology  adopted  in  each  report,  and  that  of 
the  substance  and  findings  of  each  report.  The  precise 
methodology  naturally  varies  from  report  to  report.  But 
what is striking about it is that despite using different words 
and methods of framing it, in essence the ECA always asks 
the same question: how can institutional performance and 
policy results be measured? The ECA always tries to define 
measurable indicators before it carries out its audits.
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Peer  or  comparative  assessment  is  an 
indispensable component of administrative 
capacity for effective implementation.10
The findings of the reports, of course, also vary. But in general, 
the ECA identifies faults in implementation largely where: 
a.   performance cannot be measured;
b.  what can be measured does not correspond to the desired   
  targets as defined in the relevant legislative acts; or
c.  Member States apply the rules formalistically. 
They  are  concerned  more  about  following  the  prescribed 
procedure rather measuring the actual impact of those rules.
With respect to the problem of measuring performance, the 
reports suggest that it is caused by vague definitions of the 
overall legal or policy objectives. Member States do not always 
bother  to  operationalise  more  meaningfully  those  vague 
definitions.
Concerning the discrepancy between policy objectives and 
actual performance, the reports indicate that this is caused by 
the failure of authorities to adopt implementing instruments 
that can reach the pre-set policy objectives. Instruments are 
chosen from those readily available rather than specifically 
designed for the purpose at hand.
Regarding the formalistic application of the rules, the reports 
criticise the Member States for not acting intelligently when 
focusing their enforcement efforts in high-risk areas, high-risk 
market operators or on those with the greatest need.
In all of these cases, implementation is ineffective because 
it cannot be verified whether the pursued policy objectives 
are indeed achieved. Member States make claims but do not 
back these up with tangible evidence.
These faults in implementation reflect institutional weaknesses 
and  constraints  on  administrative  capacity.  Implementing 
authorities do not always have the requisite expertise. They 
do  not  seem  to  set  verifiable  goals,  nor  do  they  appear 
accountable to define and reach such goals. They also appear 
unable  to  learn  and  adjust,  possibly  because  they  are  not 
sufficiently  empowered  and  endowed  and,  apart  from  the 
audit by the ECA, their performance is not regularly assessed.
Conclusions
No  law  or  policy  is  laid  down  in  such  precise  terms  that 
interpretation and elaboration at the stage of implementation 
become  unnecessary.  The  implementing  authority  must 
always  translate  broad  objectives  into  operational  targets, 
adopt rules and procedures and utilise the right instruments.
The term ‘effective implementation’ implies that there is: a. a 
definition of feasible and verifiable objectives; b. continuous 
measurement of the results or impact of rules, procedures and 
instruments;  and  c.  continuous  assessment  of  whether  the 
actual effects match the desired or stated objectives of the law 
or policy.
To succeed in these tasks, implementing authorities must have 
the capacity to learn and assess the impact of their actions and 
adjust their rules, procedures and instruments appropriately. 
They  must  be  sufficiently  empowered  and  endowed. They 
must also be accountable; they have to explain and justify 
their decisions. Indeed, accountability is indispensable for self-
assessment and learning.
Accountability is also an important component of institutional 
capacity  for  effective  implementation  in  the  context  of 
integrating economies. Comparison of performance against 
peers  in  partner  countries  strengthens  accountability. 
Comparison is useful because often there is no standard of 
performance that can be set ex ante with an adequate degree 
of  certainty.  Good  results  can  only  be  ‘revealed’  ex  post 
through comparison of the performance of those authorities 
that attempt to reach the same policy objective.
In  conclusion,  the  essence  of  effective  implementation  is 
that the actions of public authorities have an actual impact 
that corresponds to the aims defined by law or policy. Public 
authorities can act purposefully to achieve those aims only by 
establishing a certain institutional capacity.
In the context of the EU, effective implementation becomes a 
collaborative project because of the diversity of implementing 
instruments and procedures adopted by the various Member 
States. Comparative analysis of implementing or enforcement 
performance  is  a  necessary  component  of  determining 
whether Member States apply EU rules as best as they can.
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